A federal court granted a prisoner’s § 2255 motion because his lawyer failed to object when the same gun was counted twice — once as a separate § 924(c) conviction and again as a sentencing-guidelines increase. The guidelines do not allow that, so the lawyer’s failure was ineffective assistance. This was not a Criminal Center case.
The federal district court for the Middle District of Louisiana granted Charles London’s § 2255 motion. He had been punished twice for possessing the same weapon: once under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and again through a two-level increase under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 2D1.1(b)(1).
Outcomes vary. A past result does not predict or guarantee the outcome of any other case.
What happened in London’s case?
In August 2015, Charles London was one of about 35 people charged in a drug trafficking conspiracy. He was named in 19 counts of an 86-count superseding indictment and pleaded guilty to eight. Seven counts involved drug distribution. One was possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime under § 924(c).
The court imposed concurrent sentences of 240 and 262 months on the drug counts, plus a mandatory consecutive 60 months on the § 924(c) count — about 27 years in all.
The Fifth Circuit rejected his direct appeal. London then filed a timely § 2255 motion. He argued his lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to the double counting of the gun.
What did London have to prove?
Ineffective-assistance claims are decided under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). London had to show:
1) deficient performance by counsel; and
2) that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Deficient performance means “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Courts give lawyers a lot of deference and presume that informed strategic choices were reasonable. See Moore v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1999). But missing a clear rule that applies to your client’s sentence is not a strategy.
Prejudice means “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Why did the court rule for London?
The guidelines themselves say that when a defendant gets a § 924(c) sentence, the weapon enhancement should not also be applied to the underlying drug offense. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4, comment. (n.4). The Fifth Circuit had applied this rule in an earlier case the court cited, United States v. Molina (5th Cir. 2008). London’s lawyer should have known this and objected at sentencing.
The error was also prejudicial. Without the § 2D1.1(b)(1) increase, London’s guidelines range would have been 210-262 months instead of a higher range. “[A]ny amount of additional jail time is significant for purposes of showing prejudice.” United States v. Rivas-Lopez, 678 F.3d 353, 357 (5th Cir. 2012).
The court found London’s lawyer was ineffective at sentencing. The government agreed. The court granted the § 2255 motion and vacated the sentence.
Outcomes vary. A past result does not predict or guarantee the outcome of any other case.
Source: United States v. London, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41559 (M.D. La. Mar. 14, 2019).
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