The Strickland Two-Prong Test for Counsel

The holding in one sentence: a defendant claiming that a lawyer’s help was so defective that a conviction or sentence must be set aside must show both that the lawyer’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense. 466 U.S. at 687.

This page explains the case itself, often searched as “Strickland vs. Washington.” For how ineffective-assistance claims work in federal cases more broadly, including guilty pleas and missed appeals, see our main page on ineffective assistance of counsel.

What happened in Strickland v. Washington?

In 1976, David Washington committed a series of crimes over about ten days, including three murders. Against his lawyer’s advice, he confessed to two of the murders and waived a jury trial. He pleaded guilty to all charges. 466 U.S. at 671-72.

To prepare for sentencing, his lawyer spoke with him and, by phone, with his wife and mother. The lawyer did not look for other character witnesses or ask for a psychiatric examination. He chose instead to rely on what Washington had said at his plea hearing about his remorse and the stress he was under, and he kept out Washington’s criminal record. Id. at 672-73. The judge sentenced Washington to death.

Washington later argued in federal habeas proceedings that his lawyer was ineffective at sentencing for failing to investigate and present more mitigating evidence. The Supreme Court used his case to set a single test for these claims, and then held that he had not met it. Id. at 698-700.

Why does Strickland matter?

Before Strickland, the Supreme Court had never “directly and fully addressed a claim of ‘actual ineffectiveness’ of counsel’s assistance in a case going to trial.” 466 U.S. at 683. Strickland set the test the Court has used ever since for the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel. It applies to trials, sentencings, guilty pleas and appeals, and to every federal prisoner who claims in a § 2255 motion that a lawyer’s mistakes changed the case. Almost every ineffective-assistance decision since 1984 starts by quoting it.

The test is demanding on purpose. The Court wanted to avoid second-guessing lawyers with hindsight, so it built in a strong presumption of reasonable strategy and required proof that the mistakes mattered. That is why these claims are hard to prove, and why the strongest ones rest on specific, provable facts.

What is the two-prong test?

The Court said a claim that counsel’s help was so defective that a conviction or sentence must be reversed “has two components.” Id. at 687. Both are required.

Prong one: deficient performance

You must show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. The measure is “an objective standard of reasonableness” under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688. You must point to the specific acts or failures you challenge, and the court asks whether they were outside “the wide range of professionally competent assistance.” Id. at 690.

Prong two: prejudice

You must show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. You do not have to show it is more likely than not that the result would have changed. Id. at 693. But a mistake that made no difference is not enough.

A court does not have to take the prongs in order. If it is easier to reject a claim for lack of prejudice, the Court said, “that course should be followed.” Id. at 697.

What is the presumption of reasonable strategy?

Courts give lawyers the benefit of the doubt. “Judicial scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Id. at 689. A court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” and you must overcome the presumption that the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. The court judges the lawyer’s choices as of the time they were made, not with hindsight.

Investigation matters. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. at 690. But choices made after a less complete investigation are reasonable only to the extent that reasonable professional judgment supports the limits on the investigation, and counsel “has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 690-91.

That is why many winning claims involve something the lawyer never looked into, never told the client, or plainly got wrong on the law, rather than a judgment call that simply did not work.

How have later cases applied Strickland?

Two later Supreme Court decisions show how the test works in practice.

• Failure to investigate. In Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), the Court held that lawyers who stopped investigating their client’s background for sentencing were ineffective. Quoting Strickland, it said “strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 521. A decision not to investigate is judged by whether that decision was itself reasonable.
• Advice about deportation. In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Court held “that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation.” Id. at 374. Advice about the immigration consequences of a guilty plea is part of the Sixth Amendment duty, and the Strickland test applies to it.

How does Strickland apply in a § 2255 case?

The same test applies on collateral review. The Court said the principles “should apply in federal collateral proceedings as they do on direct appeal or in motions for a new trial,” and that “no special standards ought to apply to ineffectiveness claims made in habeas proceedings.” Id. at 697-98.

For a federal prisoner, that collateral proceeding is a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Ineffective-assistance claims usually belong there, because they often depend on facts outside the trial record, and you do not have to raise them on direct appeal first. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). The one-year deadline in § 2255(f) still applies.

Later Supreme Court cases apply Strickland to specific settings:

• Guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012); Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012).
• A missed appeal. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000); Garza v. Idaho, 586 U.S. 232 (2019).
• Sentencing. Any amount of extra prison time caused by counsel’s error can be prejudice. Glover v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 203 (2001).

Our ineffective assistance of counsel page explains those cases. For decisions applying Strickland at each stage, see lawyer errors before trial, at trial, at sentencing and on appeal.

Outcomes vary. A past result does not predict or guarantee the outcome of any other case.

When is prejudice presumed? (United States v. Cronic)

Almost every claim uses the Strickland test. But a narrow set of cases presumes prejudice, so you do not have to prove the second prong. In United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984), decided the same day as Strickland, the Court described these situations: the defendant is denied counsel at a critical stage of the case, or counsel “entirely fails to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” Id. at 659. These cases are rare. A lawyer who performs badly but still participates usually falls under Strickland, not Cronic.

Common questions

Related pages

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Federal Cases

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Sentencing

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Appeal

Cognizable Claims: Overview